MERGERS, CONSOLIDATIONS, ACQUISITIONS: EFFECT ON PERFORMANCE OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES by Parliament, Claudia & Taitt, Jodi
Staff Papers  Series
Staff Paper P89-37  September 1989
MERGERS, CONSOLIDATIONS, ACQUISITIONS:




Department  of Agricultural and Applied Economics
University  of Minnesota
Institute of Agriculture,  Forestry and Home  Economics
St. Paul, Minnesota  55108Staff Paper P89-37  September 1989
MERGERS, CONSOLIDATIONS, ACQUISITIONS:
EFFECT  ON  PERFORMANCE  OF  AGRICULTURAL  COOPERATIVES
Claudia Parliament
Jodi Taitt
Claudia Parliament is Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural
and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.  Jodi Taitt was a
research assistant in the Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics and is  currently Rates Analyst, Minnesota Department of  Public
Service.
This research was supported by the Agricultural Cooperative Service of
the United States Department of Agriculture.
The University of Minnesota is  committed to  the policy that all persons
shall have  equal access  to its programs, facilities, and employment
without regard to race, religion, color, sex, national origin, handicap,
age, veteran status or sexual orientation.ABSTRACT
Reorganization has been promoted as a means to  strengthen the
position of cooperatives within the agricultural economy.  The purpose
of this study is  to  determine if agricultural cooperatives  that
reorganized through merger, acquisition, or consolidation have improved
their financial performance.  Although the research suggests
reorganization may not be beneficial  to  the strongest cooperative in
either the  short or longer run, at least 33%  of the observed
reorganizations  can be classified as unqualified successes.  The  data
include  53  cooperatives involved in 24 reorganizations.MERGERS, CONSOLIDATIONS, ACQUISITIONS:
EFFECT ON PERFORMANCE OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
Introduction
Reorganization of cooperatives has been promoted as  a means to
strengthen the position of cooperatives within the agricultural economy.
The desire  to eliminate duplicative services, enhance market power by
consolidating competing cooperatives, and exploit economies of size are
possible motives for reorganization.  The purpose of  this study  is  to
determine if the agricultural cooperatives that engage  in mergers,
consolidations or acquisitions  improve their financial performance after
reorganization.
Previous research  (Garoyan and Cramer;  Haskell;  Swanson) has
indicated that financial performance does not always  improve after
reorganization.  However, cooperatives  continue  to merge and consolidate.
The contradiction between research and the continued enthusiasm for
cooperative reorganization on the part of some members, managers, and
advisors prompted the current inquiry.
After a brief review of previous  research on reorganization
performance,  the research design and data of this investigation are
presented.  The financial performance of the cooperatives prior to
reorganization  is described, followed by an analysis of the effects of
reorganization on the strongest  cooperative.  The next section analyzes
the impact of cooperative reorganization on the members of  the  entire
group of cooperatives participating  in the reorganization.  Concluding
comments  are presented in the final section.
*The authors wish to  thank Jim Chalfant, Murray Fulton, Jim Houck, Zvi
Lerman,  Glenn Pederson, Lee  Schrader, and Frank Smith for their
constructive comments on earlier drafts;  and the St. Paul  regional office
of the Farm Credit System for providing information and data.Previous Research
Most research on the financial performance of reorganized
cooperatives has  not been encouraging.  Garoyan and Cramer conducted a
case study of ten reorganizations  that were initiated by undercapitalized,
weak cooperatives experiencing operational difficulty.  All of the
cooperatives were motivated to  improve operating efficiency by achieving
economies of size through reorganization.  Immediately after
reorganization most of the cooperatives reduced their average total costs,
but two years after reorganization seven of the ten cooperatives were
found to be less profitable than prior  to reorganization.  Haskell
conducted a case study of four reorganizations involving a  large, strong
local cooperative merging with a small, weak cooperative.  All four
cooperatives were found to have reduced profitability three years after
reorganization.  Swanson also found that reorganized cooperatives
experienced a decrease in profitability after reorganization regardless of
the  type of reorganization.  Cooperatives participating in mergers,
however, were  found to  increase their liquidity.
Studies indicate that cooperatives have experienced strong growth
rates  through reorganization.  Mueller found that cooperatives growing by
reorganization increased total assets and sales more rapidly than those
growing internally.  Garoyan and Cramer observed similar results.  Chen
found that large  cooperatives relied on mergers and acquisitions for their
growth to a greater extent than comparable investor-owned firms.
Historically, however, cooperatives have  tended to  grow  -hrough internal
rather than external expansion  (Mueller; Cobia and Farris;  Garoyan and
Cramer).
2The research results  on reorganization of investor owned firms  are
largely similar.  In a case  study examining reorganizations  of investor-
owned corporations, Kitching concludes  that improvements  in efficiency and
profitability were generally small.  In retrospect almost one-third of the
case study mergers  (21  out of 69) were rated as  failures by  the executives
involved in the reorganization.
In a review of previous  research on mergers and profitability of
investor-owned firms, Utton found little support for the hypothesis that
mergers enhance  firm performance.  Only two out  of thirteen studies using
financial statement data indicated mergers led  to  improved performance,
six found no difference, and  five concluded performance declined.
Contrary to these findings, studies analyzing the benefits  of
reorganization of investor-owned firms through stock price behavior
indicate  that mergers and acquisitions  improve efficiency  (Council of
Economic Advisors).  A criticism of stock market analysis, however, is  the
assumption that  "stock market reactions are necessarily correct in their
predictions of merger consequences"  (Ravenscraft and Scherer, p. 8).  In
any case,  stock prices cannot be used to  analyze  the performance of
cooperatives because there  is no market for cooperative shares and
cooperative reorganization cannot be motivated by under-valued stocks.
There are  several shortcomings to  the previous  research on
cooperative reorganizations.  Previous authors attributed all changes in
performance to  reorganization, disregarding the effects  of industry
changes, macro-economic conditions, or  government policies.  Also the
length of time observed after reorganization may have been too short to
detect changes  in performance.  The  current  inquiry attempts to  mitigate
3these  shortcomings by measuring the financial performance of
reorganization participants relative  to  the average performance  of a
related population of cooperatives, and by supplementing the  analysis of
the short-run post-reorganization performance with an analysis of longer
run performance.  Unlike previous studies, the present research also
attempts  to  analyze the overall effect of reorganization on members of all
the reorganizing  cooperatives.
Data and Research Design
The data consist of the annual operating statements and balance
sheets of the 53 Minnesota local cooperatives that participated in 24
reorganizations between the years 1979  to  1984.  A local cooperative
typically serves  the geographic area surrounding one community.
Reorganizations are conventionally classified into three  categories:
mergers, acquisitions, and consolidations.  A merger occurs when two or
more firms combine and only one  of the firms maintains  its  identity;  an
acquisition occurs when the control  of a firm's  assets  is purchased by
another firm;  a consolidation occurs when one or more firms  combine to
form one new firm.  In mergers or acquisitions, one firm "survives" and
retains  its  identity.  In a consolidation no firm retains  its  original
identity but one  of the participants usually can be identified as  the
strongest by some measure.  In this research, the  24 post-reorganization
cooperatives were formed through  ten mergers, six acquisitions,  and eight
consolidations.
4This research uses  two approaches to measuring the effect of
reorganization on financial performance.  The first approach, similar to
the approach used by previous authors, analyzes  the change in the pre and
post-reorganization financial performance of  the surviving or  strongest
participant.  The second approach, which is  novel to  this study, examines
the post-reorganization financial performance of the new cooperative to
the pre-reorganization financial performance of all of the reorganization
participants.
Another feature  of this  research is  the analysis  of the relative
success  of "horizontal"  and "congeneric" reorganizations.  A
reorganization is  referred to  as  "horizontal"  if the participants are  in
the same  line of business  (i.e. a grain cooperative combining with other
grain cooperatives).  A reorganization is  referred to  as  "congeneric" if
the participants  do not specialize  in the  same service  (i.e. a grain
cooperative combining with non-grain cooperatives).  The analysis will
attempt to determine if one of these two types of reorganization has a
significant effect on financial performance.
Corporate performance  is conventionally measured by financial ratios.
In this research, annual ratios measuring liquidity, labor efficiency,
leverage and profitability were calculated for  each of the reorganizing
cooperatives.
The liquidity ratio measures  the degree  to which  the  cooperative's
current liabilities are  covered by the  liquid current  assets.  In this
study liquidity is measured by the  ratio of current assets  less inventory
to current liabilities.  Known as  the  "acid test"  or  "quick" ratio, this
liquidity ratio  is a more conservative measure than the current ratio.
5The labor efficiency ratio measures how the cooperative  is utilizing
its human resources.  For  this research, labor efficiency  is measured by
the salaries  to  sales ratio,  the labor expense per dollar of sales.
Salary expenditure includes both wage and salary employees.
The leverage ratio measures the proportion of assets  financed by
creditors.  Here, leverage  is measured by  the ratio of total  liabilities
to local assets, where  local assets are defined as total assets  less
investments in other cooperatives.  The rationale  for measuring leverage
by a ratio based on local rather than total assets  is  due  to  the  inability
of a local cooperative  to liquidate its  investment in other cooperatives
in order to repay its debt.
The profitability ratio measures the operating performance of the
firm.  In this study profitability is measured by the ratio of local net
margin to sales.  The local net margin is  calculated by deducting from
total  income  the cost of goods  sold, operating expenses, and patronage
refunds received from other cooperatives.  Again local net margins  are
used in order to  isolate the profitability of the local  cooperative from
the contribution of its  relations with other cooperatives.
A return-on-assets  profitability ratio was not included in the
analysis for  two reasons.  The period of study included years of fairly
high inflation, which introduced a significant downward bias  in the
historical book value of the fixed assets.  Profitability is  therefore
measured in this study by a ratio of two current-value items,  net margins
and sales.  In addition, information was not available for each
cooperative as to how asset valuation was handled at  the time of
6reorganization.  Assets may have been revalued to  replacement value or
continued to be carried at book value.
Financial ratios change over time even without reorganization.  To
illustrate the variability of financial ratios  over time, Figure  1
presents the average leverage ratio of Minnesota farm supply, petroleum
and grain cooperatives for the period 1976  to  1986.1  The figure indicates
that the  1970s  were characterized by an increase in borrowing as
cooperatives expanded their facilities and services in response to the
strong agricultural economy.  During the 1980s,  the average cooperative
experienced a decrease in borrowing as  expansion activities were  curtailed
in response to  the decline  in the agricultural economy.  Figure 1
underscores  the importance  of comparing the performance of an individual
cooperative to  a control group.  For example,  if the evaluation of a
cooperative's  leverage does not account for changes  in the external
environment, a decrease  in  the leverage of a reorganized cooperative in
the  1980s would be entirely attributed to  reorganization without rather
than accounting for  industry-wide responses to  changes  in the economy.
To adjust for factors affecting all cooperatives and to  account for
differences among types of cooperatives,  each financial ratio  of a
reorganized cooperative  is divided for each year by the average  ratio of
the population of similar Minnesota cooperatives borrowing from the St.
Paul  office of the Farm Credit System.  For  example, the 1980
profitability ratio  for a reorganized grain cooperative  is  divided by the
1980 average profitability ratio for the population of Minnesota grain
cooperatives.  The division of each cooperative's ratio by the average
ratio for a population of cooperatives of a similar  type standardizes the
7FIGURE  1.  Average Total Liability/Local Assets Ratio of
Minnesota Farm  Supply, Grain, and Petroleum
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8data.  The resulting standardized ratios  indicate a cooperative's
performance relative to  cooperatives with similar product mixes.
The cooperative's financial performance before reorganization is
determined by calculating a two-year standardized average  of each ratio
prior to  reorganization  in order to avoid a snapshot effect.  To determine
performance after reorganization, two post-reorganization averages are
calculated -- short run and longer run.  Short run performance  is measured
by the average  of the second and third year's ratio after reorganization.
At least one  full year was allowed to  elapse after reorganization before
financial data were used to construct post-reorganization averages.  The
second year observation was between 12  and 23 months after  reorganization,
depending on the timing of  the reorganization relative to  the annual
financial statement date.  Longer run performance  is measured by the
average of the fifth and sixth year's ratio after reorganization whenever
data are available.
Pre-Reorganization Performance
The relative performance of the cooperatives prior to reorganization
is analyzed in order to  test the following:
*  are cooperatives entering reorganization significantly
different than the average cooperative?
*  does  one type of reorganization involve significantly
stronger or weaker participants?
*  are there  significant pre-reorganization differences
between the  survivors and the non-survivors?
9Previous research on investor-owned firms suggests  that acquired
companies  (the  "non-survivors")  are appreciably less profitable on average
than their acquirers  (the "survivors")  or  the control group  (Ravenscraft
and Scherer;  Dewey;  Manne).
Ordinary least squares regression is used to examine the relative
financial characteristics  of the  53  cooperatives that reorganized.  Four
regression were run, one  for each of the performance ratios.  The
dependent variable  in the regression is  the  standardized two-year average
of the ratio prior to reorganization.  The explanatory variables  are dummy
variables  for  the type of reorganization, the  type of cooperative, and
whether or not the cooperative survives after reorganization.
The  ratio of an average cooperative equals one due  to
standardization.  In order to test for significant differences of the
reorganization participants  from the average cooperative, Table 1 presents
the values of 1 minus the estimated ratio  for each reorganization
category. Ratios that are  significantly different from 1 by the t-test are
indicated by asterisks.
For non-surviving cooperatives  (both acquired and merged),  the
estimated mean profitability ratio is  significantly below average and
negative indicating a net loss position prior  to reorganization.  An
examination of the data indicates that  all six acquired cooperatives and
eight of the ten non-surviving merged cooperatives were  in a net  loss
position prior to  reorganization.  In contrast, Ravenscraft and Scherer
reported that only 5.8%  of the 634 firms acquired by companies  traded on
the New York Stock Exchange had a negative operating income prior to
10Table  1.  Estimated Difference  from Average  for Reorganization  Participants
Reorganization  Liquidity  Efficiency  Leverage  Profit
Classification  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio
Non  Survivors
Mergers
grain  -. 04***  -. 01  .31***  -2.45***
farm supply  -. 14  .17  .31*  -2.04**
petroleum  -. 35  .14  .53*  -6.23***
Acquisitions
grain  -. 22  .31*  .63***  -3 77***
farm supply  -. 33**  .49***  .62***  -3.36***
petroleum  -. 54*  .47**  .85***  -7.55***
Consolidations
grain  -. 07  .08  .09  -1.41*
farm supply  -. 17  .25*  .08  -1.00
Survivors
Mergers
grain  .32*  -. 21*  -. 19*  1.12
farm supply  .22  -. 03  -. 20  1.54
Acquisitions
grain  .13  .12  .12  -. 19
farm supply  -. 03  .30*  .11  .22
Note:  For the efficiency and leverage ratios a positive value indicates below
average performance.
There are no petroleum survivors in the data.
Difference  from  1 tested using T-ratio:
*Statistically  significant at  the  10%  level of  confidence.
**Statistically  significant at  the 5% level of  confidence.
***Statistically significant at  the  1% level of confidence.
11acquisition.  These results suggest  that, among cooperatives, mergers  and
acquisitions may have been used as  an alternative to bankruptcy.
In addition to  the below average profitability, the acquired
cooperatives are  estimated to be significantly more leveraged, less
liquid, and less  labor efficient than average prior to  reorganization.
The significantly below average performance for the acquired cooperatives
may explain why these weak cooperatives  are indeed acquired and are unable
to bargain successfully for retaining a measure of ownership through a
merger or consolidation.
For consolidators, none of estimated mean performance ratios  are
significantly above average prior to reorganization and in two categories
their estimated ratios are  significantly below average.  On average the
profitability ratio of the consolidating grain cooperatives and mean labor
efficiency ratios of the consolidating farm supply cooperatives are
estimated to be significantly below average.
For  the last category, most surviving cooperatives also do not seem
to be reorganizing from a position of relative strength.  Only the
surviving grain cooperatives that merge appear to be financially strong
prior to  reorganization. Their liquidity, labor efficiency, and leverage
ratios are  significantly above average.  None of the surviving mergers or
acquirers categories, however, have an estimated mean profitability ratio
significantly above average prior to  reorganization.
In summary, the pre-reorganization estimates  indicate that on
average:
acquired cooperatives are performing below average in all
four ratios;
12*  the non-surviving merged cooperatives  are below average.in
profitability and leverage;
*  most consolidation participants are average performers;
*  most reorganization survivors are average performers;
*  grain cooperatives dominating a merger are the  financially
strongest reorganization participants.
Post-Reorganization Performance:  The Strongest Cooperative's Perspective
In order to  detect the effect of reorganization,  the pre and post-
reorganization performance ratios of the strongest cooperative are
compared.  The comparison indicates if the reorganization improves,
weakens, or  leaves unchanged the strongest participant's measures of
financial performance.  For mergers and acquisitions the cooperative that
has retained its  identity is  considered the strongest cooperative.  In the
case of consolidation, no one cooperative retains  its  identity and a
decision has to  be made as  to which of the  two or  three participants  in
the consolidation should be treated as  the strongest cooperative.
Examination of all the observations in the data shows that higher
profitability is  the only financial ratio by which merger and acquisition
survivors  outperform the non-survivors in every observation.  Thus, the
consolidator with the highest pre-reorganization profitability among the
participants  is  treated as the strongest cooperative in the analysis.
Ordinary least squares regression is used to  estimate the effects of
various forms of reorganization on the change  in each relative performance
ratio.  The dependent variable is  the difference in thr  two-year average
standardized ratio before and after reorganization for the strongest
cooperative.  The explanatory variables are  the type of reorganization,
13the type  of cooperative, the pre-reorganization ratio and a dummy variable
indicating if the reorganization is a "horizontal" or  "congeneric"
reorganization.  The value of the pre-reorganization ratio  is  included as
an explanatory variable to  determine if the initial relative strength of
the cooperative affects  the change  in the ratio.
The regression equations are estimated using both the short  run and
longer run data.  The estimated dummy variable coefficients are used to
construct the estimated effects of the 12  reorganization categories on the
change in each performance ratio of the strongest cooperative.  The r-
squares  for the eight regressions range from  .37 to  .67 for the  short run
regressions and  .71  to  .88 for the  long run regressions.  An analysis of
the  short and longer run effects  is reported in the next two subsections.
Short Run Performance
To measure changes  in short run performance, the  two-year average of
each ratio  for the second and third year after reorganization is  compared
to the two-year average of the strongest cooperative immediately prior  to
reorganization.
Table 2 reports  the results of  testing the hypothesis  that  the
estimated effects of reorganization on the change  in the ratio equal  zero.
In each of the 12  reorganization categories,  reorganization is  found to
have a significant negative effect on at least one of the  following
performance  ratios:  leverage, efficiency, or profitability.  Because
reorganization usually involves an increase  in long term financing,  it is
not surprising that most reorganizations have a significant negative
effect on leverage.  The significant negative effect on the efficient use
14Table  2.  The  Effect  of  Reorganization  on the  Change  in Financial Ratios:
Short Run Case
Reorganization  Liquidity  Efficiency  Leverage  Profit
Classification  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio
Grain
Mergers
congeneric  .83***  .59***  -. 14  1.17
horizontal  .49  .45**  .06  .38
Acquisition
congeneric  .35  .52**  .11  .97
horizontal  .02  .38*  .31**  .18
Consolidation
congeneric  .54*  .47*  .11  .55
horizontal  .21  .33  .31**  -. 24
Farm Supply
Mergers
congeneric  .77**  .48*  .21  -2.01
horizontal  .43  .34  .41***  -2.80*
Acquisition
congeneric  .29  .41  .45***  -2.21
horizontal  -. 04  .27  .65***  -3.00*
Consolidation
congeneric  .48  .36  .45***  -2.63
horizontal  .15  .22  .65***  -3.42**
Note:  Positive values indicate a negative effect on efficiency and leverage.
Difference from  0 tested using T-ratio  in a two tailed test.
*Statistically significant at  the  10%  level of  confidence.
**Statistically significant at  the  5% level of  confidence.
***Statistically significant at the  1% level of confidence.
15of personnel may reflect the difficulty that Boards of Directors and
managers have  in restructuring personnel and releasing redundant  labor in
small communities.  With respect  to profitability, more  than 3 years may
be necessary before reorganization can begin to have a positive effect.
Most reorganization categories  involving farm supply cooperatives
have a significant negative effect on profitability, whereas  the
reorganizations of grain cooperatives have no  significant effect on
profitability.  The differential impact on profitability between grain and
farm supply cooperatives may be related to  reorganization motives.  The
grain cooperatives may have  initiated a reorganization to capture  the  cost
economies of size resulting from the structural changes  in rail
transportation during the period of analysis, whereas  the farm supply
cooperatives may have initiated a reorganization to maintain market share
or been pressured to rescue a  financially weak cooperative.  Profitability
should be easier to maintain when a reorganization  is motivated by scale
economies rather than undertaken as a defensive strategy.
Liquidity is  the only performance ratio  that is  estimated to
significantly improved in some of reorganization categories.  These
results  are  similar to  Swanson's  findings that mergers increase  liquidity,
but with the refinement that only congeneric mergers have a significant
and positive effect on liquidity.  This reorganization effect on liquidity
may be due  to diversification achieved through  the reorganization of
dissimilar cooperatives which have different seasonal cash flow
requirements.
Pre-reorganization performance was  found to have a significant
positive effect on the short  run change  in the liquidity and efficiency
16ratios after reorganization.  The profitability and leverage ratios were
not affected by the pre-reorganization performance in the  short run.
Longer  Run Performance
Longer run performance  is measured by an average  of the  ratios  for
fifth and sixth year after reorganization, which is compared to  the pre-
organization ratio.  Longer run data are only available  for 14 of the 24
reorganizations  -- six mergers,  five consolidations, and three
acquisitions.  The  lack of long-term data  is  the result of the  recent
occurrence of six of the reorganizations and not enough time has elapsed
to have  longer run data.  In addition, four of reorganization observations
were lost because the cooperatives subsequently dissolved or underwent
further reorganization.
Table 3 reports  the results of testing the hypothesis that  the
longer-run effects of the reorganization categories equal zero.  The
longer-run results  indicate that on average:
*  all reorganization categories have a negative effect
on labor efficiency;
*  most reorganization categories have a negative effect on
leverage;
*  most reorganization categories have a positive effect
on liquidity;
*  congeneric reorganizations of grain cooperatives have a
positive effect on profitability;
Unlike the short run case, none of the reorganization categories have
a significant negative effect on profitability, and the pre-reorganization
performance ratio  is  found to have a significant positive effect on the
change in all four performance ratios.  These effects  of the pre-
17Table  3.  The  Effect  of  Reorganization  on  the Change  in  Financial Ratios:
Longer  Run Case
Reorganization  Liquidity  Efficiency  Leverage  Profit
Classification  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio
Grain
Mergers
congeneric  .90***  1.29***  .39  1.76*
horizontal  1.06***  1.02***  .44*  .93
Acquisition
congeneric  .65**  1.09**  .34  3.08*
horizontal  .81*  .82**  .39  2.26
Consolidation
congeneric  .80***  1.26***  .37  2.02*
horizontal  .96 *** .99**  .43*  1.20
Farm Supply
Mergers
congeneric  .42**  1.51**  .89***  .29
horizontal  .58**  1.23**  .95 ***  -. 53
Acquisition
congeneric  .17  1.30**  .85***  1.62
horizontal  .33  1.03**  .90***  .80
Consolidation
congeneric  .32  1.48**  .88***  .56
horizontal  .48*  1.21**  .94***  -. 27
Note:  Positive values for a reorganization category indicates a negative effect
on the efficiency and leverage ratios.
Difference from  0 tested using T-ratio  in  a two tailed test.
*Statistically significant at  the  10%  level of  confidence.
**Statistically  significant at the  5%  level of  confidence.
.*"Statistically  significant at  the  1% level of confidence.
18reorganization ratios  imply that the  financial strength of  the cooperative
prior to  reorganization affects the change  in financial performance after
reorganization.
Post-Reorganization Performance:  Comparison to All Pre-reorganization
Participants
Up to this point, the analysis has focused on the effects  of the
reorganization on the  financial performance of the  strongest participant
involved in the reorganization.  This approach ignores the effect of  the
reorganization on the other participants.  Cooperative reorganization can
also be evaluated by comparing a post-reorganization performance ratio  to
the pre-reorganization ratio  of each participant.  A reorganization can
then be classified as  an unqualified success if the post-reorganization
performance ratio is  stronger  than the performance ratio of all of the
reorganization participants prior to reorganization (stronger than the
strongest pre-reorganization participant ratio).  In this case,  the
reorganization can be considered Pareto optimal,  as  all participants are
better off compared to  their pre-reorganization performance.  A
reorganization is classified as  a failure  if the post-reorganization
performance ratio  is weaker than the weakest pre-reorganization ratio of
any of the participants.  A reorganization is  classified as a "judgement
call"  if the post-reorganization performance ratio does not  fall  into
either category.  In  this case,  the strongest participant has  not improved
performance, yet the reorganized cooperative is  stronger than the weakest
participant prior to  reorganization.
19Figure 2 illustrates  the distribution of the success, failure,  and
judgement call  outcomes of the  24 reorganizations using the profitability
performance ratio as  the basis for comparison.  In the  short run three of
the reorganizations  are unqualified failures and the  "judgement calls"
outnumber the unqualified successes.  In the longer run, the failure
category consists  of two cooperatives that dissolved after reorganization.
The cooperatives  that have undertaken further reorganization can not
classified into one of the three previously defined categories and are
classified as  reorganized.  Six longer run reorganization outcomes  are
unknown due to  their relatively recent occurrence.  In the longer run
there  are 8 unqualified successes and 6 judgement calls.
It may be argued that all  "judgement  calls" should be considered a
success because the performance has  improved for at least  one of the
cooperatives.  The reorganization has not benefited the strongest
cooperative, but a weaker cooperative has been strengthen and the members
of that cooperative have benefited.  This improvement has been achieved,
however, at the cost of a decline  in the performance  for the strongest
participant.  To classify this situation as  something other than a
judgement call requires assigning relative weights  to the reorganization
participants.
Conclusion
A primary objective of this research was  to determine  if cooperatives
improve if the agricultural cooperatives that engage in mergers,
consolidations  or acquisitions improve  their financial performance after
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21indicate  that anticipated financial benefits  may not materialize  after
reorganization in both the short and the long run.  The reorganization
planners may have expected more than the circumstances merited.  They may
have over-estimated the cooperative's ability  to  integrate and manage a
more complex operation.
Not only are  there limited improvements in relative financial
performance, but significant declines were  found in many of the
performance measures.  If reorganizations create labor inefficiencies,
increase  risk through higher leverage ratios, and do not significantly
increase profitability,  then unqualified support  for reorganization of
local cooperatives should be questioned.  It may be argued that  the
limited improvements  in performance after reorganization may be
attributable  to  the pre-reorganization weakness of the participants rather
than inherent or systemic  flaws of reorganization.
Although this research suggests that on average the financial
consequences of reorganization may not be beneficial to  the strongest
cooperative, at least  33% of the observed reorganizations can be
classified as unqualified successes.  The analysis underscores  the need
for caution.  Cooperative members must carefully appraise both the
expected benefits and potential risks before deciding to reorganize.
22Footnotes
1Grain cooperatives are  defined as  cooperatives that have at  least
65  percent of total sales and 30 percent of gross margins from the grain
commodity area.  Petroleum cooperatives have at least  60 percent of total
sales and 47 percent of gross margins  in petroleum products.  Cooperatives
that do not meet the characteristics of either specialized cooperative
type are classified as farm supply cooperatives. These defining parameters
are determined and used by  the St.  Paul office  of the Farm Credit System.
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